ISIS Built Presences In West Africa No Longer Holds Substantial Base In Sunni Countries

ISIS is no longer the same group it was in the days of the 2015 Paris attacks and its sweeping “caliphate” across Iraq, Syria, and beyond. The group was once able to flaunt itself as a serious military force via propaganda of training camps and fighters parading through controlled territories in rows of weapons-mounted trucks. Not anymore.

ISIS publicly burned a Jordanian pilot alive or drowned prisoners in cages in Hollywood style productions: making sure that its name continues to occupy headlines. 

For ISIS, staying relevant and staying existent are one and the same. And to survive under the Taliban, the group will go to any and all extremes to maintain relevance. The airport attack was just another effort to hijack the conversation.: Headlines, news shows, and social media veered away from the U.S. withdrawal and Taliban takeover, and instead focused once more on the threat of ISIS. The group’s deadly suicide operations against Shi’ites and other soft targets in Afghanistan since then have done the same—all without any significant numbers or resources. 

The Taliban’s Afghanistan takeover had other global implications for ISIS as well, because it was a mutual victory for an even deeper-rooted ISIS rival: al Qaeda.

While ISIS took a fast path to the caliphate, al Qaeda, the group from which ISIS split, urged patience. This was among ISIS’s favourite places to jab at al Qaeda, arguing to the global jihadi movement that its longer-standing rival had lost its way since 9/11 and had become useless in pursuing true Islamic statehood. 

But in the end, ISIS lost it all while al Qaeda is finally seeing its strategy and narrative vindicated. This creates a powerful narrative within the global jihadist community, which is driven in no small part by narratives of victory and uncompromising piety. 

Here is al Qaeda’s most powerful and longstanding ally, the Taliban, having established an “Islamic Emirate” after defeating the world’s most powerful military. And here is al Qaeda—its bonds with the Taliban just as strong as ever—sharing in that historic victory with a guaranteed place to regroup and grow after enduring so many tribulations. Al Qaeda’s past losses or its leadership’s lack of charisma no longer hinder it, because it can boast that its long-preached steadfastness is paying off.

And meanwhile, here is ISIS: everything lost, its propaganda machine a shell of what it once was, and its methodology a demonstrable failure. A so-called “Islamic State” that is anything but.

Sure, it has built presences in regions like West Africa, but it no longer holds a substantial base in any Sunni-majority country. They have pitched their tents in mostly West Africa in allegiance to Al-shabab,

Boko haram in countries such as Nigeria, Somalia, Niger Republic, Mali, Cameroon, even Sudan and others. Its propaganda now shows meagrely constructed training camps, and poorly equipped fighters confined to hidden bases. 

While the impact of ISIS losing territories like Mosul and Raqqa are immeasurable, the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan is its own unique nightmare for ISIS, even if only symbolically. It is the final nail in the coffin for the pretensions of statehood it had still been holding onto. Whether it keeps with the gimmick or not, they know, just as the global jihadi community knows, that there is no viable path back to sweeping territories anymore. Not in Afghanistan, not in Syria, not anywhere.